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Research Manuscript
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Silicon Under Siege: Hardware-Rooted Attacks and Defenses in Modern SoCs
DescriptionModern SoCs expose a rapidly expanding hardware attack surface that bridges memory, microarchitecture, and physical leakage. This session presents cutting-edge methodologies targeting DRAM disturbance (RowHammer), EM emanations, and microarchitectural structures like TLB and page-table walkers. It features cross-core leakage analyses on Apple silicon and practical fault exploitation of post-quantum primitives. Balancing offense with defense, the session introduces hardware-assisted monitoring and compiler-level mitigations against transient execution. Together, these works advance the characterization of hardware-rooted threats, providing actionable insights for securing the next generation of high-performance computing platforms.
Event Type
Research Manuscript
TimeTuesday, July 2810:30am - 12:30pm PDT
LocationMtg Room 202AB
Topics
Security
Tracks
SEC3-I. Hardware Security: Attack and Defense
Presentations
10:30am - 10:43am PDTShooting Falcon with One Fault: A Practical Rowhammer-Based Fault Attack Against Falcon
10:43am - 10:56am PDTCapacitive Touchscreens at Risk: Recovering Handwritten Trajectory on Smartphone via Electromagnetic Emanations
10:56am - 11:10am PDTExploiting Per-Core Leakage: Electromagnetic Side-Channel Monitoring of Multicore Architectures
11:10am - 11:23am PDTTRAC: Transparent Row Activation Counting for Efficient Rowhammer Monitoring
11:23am - 11:36am PDTSlcross: Cross-Component System-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks on Apple M2 SoC
11:36am - 11:50am PDTMistletunnel: Attacking KASLR on Apple M-Series Silicon with a Novel TLB Side Channel
11:50am - 12:03pm PDTStone-Skimming: Attacking Big-Data Analytics Applications with Page Table Walk
12:03pm - 12:16pm PDTEmudrop: A Minimalistic, Hardware-Based Emulation Detection Approach Through Intel Reserved Opcodes
12:16pm - 12:30pm PDTJanus: Compiler-Based Defense Against Transient Execution Attacks Using ARM Hardware Primitives