Presentation
Defending Side-Channel Attacks in Client-Side Deduplication with Hardware/software Codesign
DescriptionClient-side deduplication can reduce redundant data transfer, but its duplicate check may expose the file existence status to attackers. Existing software-only defenses provide limited protection and impose substantial computation. Accordingly, we present RSCD, a Raptor-code and SGX Co-Designed framework that mitigate side-channel leakage in client-side deduplication. RSCD employs sparse XOR-based Raptor coding to obfuscate deduplication patterns with low overhead and uses an SGX enclave protected dirty-chunk detector to identify probing through feature analysis. Our formal analysis shows near-optimal privacy, and the experimental results demonstrate that RSCD consistently achieves lower latency, higher throughput and accuracy in attack detection than SOTA defenses.
Event Type
Work in Progress
TimeMonday, July 275:05pm - 5:06pm PDT
LocationExhibit Hall