Presentation
Stone-Skimming: Attacking Big-Data Analytics Applications with Page Table Walk
DescriptionThis paper proposes the Stone-Skimming microarchitectural attack, the first page table walk (PTW)-based attack targeting large-scale sensitive memory applications. Stone-Skimming leverages the correlation among multiple signals to establish novel side channel attacks. We develop the first microarchitectural attack targeting DNA sequence reconstruction. Multiple PTW entries generated by the victim are cross-validated, enabling robust DNA reconstruction where traditional attacks fail. Moreover, we discover a new stateful side effect of PTW on prefetch instructions that can be exploited to break KASLR, even with KPTI on. We also introduce the early-instruction-fetch (early-IF) attack capable of bypassing LFENCE and CPUID defense.
Event Type
Research Manuscript
TimeTuesday, July 2811:50am - 12:03pm PDT
LocationMtg Room 202AB
