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CARAMEL: Boosting Device Utilization in Control Flow Auditing
DescriptionMicrocontroller Units (MCUs) are widely used in safety-critical systems, making them frequent attack targets. This demands lightweight defenses that remain reliable even after software compromise. Control Flow Auditing (CF-Aud) strengthens Control Flow Attestation by ensuring authenticated control-flow logs (CFLogs) are reliably delivered from a compromised prover (Prv) to a remote verifier (Vrf), enabling assessment of system behavior and support for remediation. However, existing CF-Aud designs rely on a costly busy-wait phase that limits Prv's utilization. In this work, we propose CARAMEL: a hybrid hardware-software root-of-trust architecture that reduces this bottleneck by enabling log transmission without halting execution. Its minimal communication interface and implementation are open-source.