Presentation
Thrend: Mitigating Counting Thread-Based Fine-Grained Timing on Arm and Apple CPUs
DescriptionThis paper presents Thrend, the first defense that mitigates counting threads used in timing side-channel attacks on Arm and Apple CPUs through real-time monitoring and scheduling. Thrend leverages fuzzing to automatically generate high-quality counting threads for training, and detects them by sampling hardware performance counters. For suspected counting threads, Thrend prevents effective timing measurements by co-scheduling the attacker threads and the counting threads on the same core. We implement Thrend on four ARM and Apple devices. Under the sampling rate of 100 Hz, Thrend achieves 99.71% detection accuracy, a 0% false-negative rate, and incurs less than 1.42% runtime overhead.
Event Type
Research Manuscript
TimeMonday, July 273:42pm - 3:54pm PDT
LocationMtg Room 203C