Presentation
Slcross: Cross-Component System-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks on Apple M2 SoC
DescriptionCross-component cache side-channel attacks exploit shared cache resources across different processing units to infer sensitive information, posing a significant threat to modern heterogeneous computing systems. However, the effectiveness of fine-grained cache attacks across components on Apple silicon remains unexplored.
In this paper, we demonstrate that cross-component cache attacks can leak GPU sensitive information from the CPU via the System-Level Cache (SLC) on Apple M2 SoC. We first reverse-engineer the key SLC mechanisms required to enable cache attacks. Leveraging this knowledge, we introduce a GPU-to-CPU covert channel and attack targeting the Large Language Model (LLM) embedding table during local LLM inference.
In this paper, we demonstrate that cross-component cache attacks can leak GPU sensitive information from the CPU via the System-Level Cache (SLC) on Apple M2 SoC. We first reverse-engineer the key SLC mechanisms required to enable cache attacks. Leveraging this knowledge, we introduce a GPU-to-CPU covert channel and attack targeting the Large Language Model (LLM) embedding table during local LLM inference.
Event Type
Research Manuscript
TimeTuesday, July 2811:23am - 11:36am PDT
LocationMtg Room 202AB