Presentation
Shooting Falcon with One Fault: A Practical Rowhammer-Based Fault Attack Against Falcon
DescriptionFalcon, a compact post-quantum digital signature scheme, has been selected by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the standardization of post-quantum cryptography. While it effectively mitigates the emerging quantum threats, its susceptibly to fault attacks remains insufficiently understood. In this work, we present a novel Rowhammer-based fault attack against Falcon with only one single-bit flip, significantly reduces the number of required faulty signatures by 800× compared to the state-of-the-art attack. Our solution identifies a new vulnerable address offset in Falcon and optimizes the classical Hidden Parallelepiped Problem (HPP) attack. Our end-to-end attack on the Falcon-512 reference implementation successfully recovers the secret key with only 250k faulty signatures.
Event Type
Research Manuscript
TimeTuesday, July 2810:30am - 10:43am PDT
LocationMtg Room 202AB
